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The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military
Until November 8, 1967, women could not, by law, constitute more
than two percent of the total military personnel in the armed forces.'
Even with the lifting of this statutory bar, women are not yet an in-
tegral part of the armed services, comprising only 1.9 percent of the
total personnel. 2 This low level of participation undoubtedly reflects
a widespread feeling among women as well as men that combat is essen-
tially a male activity, but it may also be the result of the numerous
statutes, regulations and informal policies that disfavor women at every
level of the military hierarchy.3 Many of these sex distinctions have
been discarded during the last decade in response to a resurgent con-
cern for the rights of women. 4 Others persist, however, reflecting the
continuing belief of military and legislative decision-makers that gen-
erally women are inadequate or inappropriate substitutes for men in
many military positions.5
The prevailing policy of the military, as a representative of the Air
Force expressed it, is that personnel policies and procedures should be
made essentially the same for men and women "except where there are
legitimate rational reasons to do otherwise."O This test may not even
1. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 3209 (1964), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 3209(b) (1970); Act of
Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 298, repealed by Act of Nov. 8, 1967. Pub. L No.
90-130, § 1(b), 81 Stat. 376; Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041. 70A Stat. 299, repealed by
Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, § 1(16), 81 Stat. 376. The two percent limit still
exists in the Army, maintained by regulation. 32 C.F.R. § 580A(b) (1972).
2. CENTRAL ALL-VoLuNTEER FORCE TASK FORCE, UTzrITON OF MiLtTARY WOM!EN vi
(1972) [hereinafter cited as TASK FoRCE REPORT]. The number of women in the Air
Force has doubled in the past five I-ears, whereas the number of women in the Marines
has shrunk by thirty percent. Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on the Utilization
of Manpower in the Military of the House Conin. on Armed Services, 92d Cong., Ist
& 2d Sess. 12439 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Utilization Hearings].
3. The Navy has compiled twenty-two pages of computer printout that list sections
of the United States Code which distinguish between Navy men and women. Telephone
Interview with Captain Robin Quigley, Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel (Women),
Nov. 20, 1972.
4. The services are carrying out comprehensive reviews of the regulations which make
distinctions between the sexes. Telephone Interviews with Brig. General Jeanne M. Holm,
Director of Women in the Air Force, Nov. 1, 1972 (on March 1, 1973, General Holm
assumed her new position as Director Secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council),
and Captain Robin Quigley, supra note 3. Congress eliminated a considerable number
of statutory distinctions in 1967, see Pub. L. No. 90-130, 71 Stat. 375 (1967); note I
supra; and the courts have also struck down a variety of policies, see, e.g., notes 8 &
140 infra.
5. This attitude was bluntly expressed by General Lewis B. Hershey, former Director
of the Selective Service System:
There is no question but that women could do a lot of things in the military service.
So could men in wheelchairs. But you couldn't expect the services to want a whole
company of people in wheelchairs.
Coye, The Restricted Unrestricted Line Officer: The Status of the Navy's Woman Line
Officer, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. (March 1972), reprinted in Utilization Hearings, supra
note 2, at 12477.
6. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12451 (testimony of General Holm).
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satisfy existing judicial standards. The Supreme Court recently divided
evenly on the issue of whether sex is a suspect classification7. In Fron-
tiero v. Richardson,8 four Justices declared that "classifications based
upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national ori-
gin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny."9 Lacking clear direction from the Supreme Court,
several state and lower federal courts appear to be developing an inter-
mediate standard of scrutiny in reviewing sex-based classifications."0
Congress may have obviated resolution of this issue by passing the
Equal Rights Amendment, which, if ratified by the states, would re-
quire an even more stringent standard than advocated by the four jus-
tices in Frontiero. This Note will discuss some of the more significant
distinctions between men and women that still exist in the military,
and assess the constitutionality of these differences under the proposed
Amendment.
I. Interpretation of the Equal Rights Amendment
The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) states that:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex."'
7. Previously, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). the Supreme Court appeared to
have used a rational basis test to invalidate a state statute which provided that when
equally qualified male and female applicants apply for appointment as administrators
of an estate, the man must be chosen. However, since the requirements of the rational
basis test were not satisfied, the Court did not have to reach the issue of whether
the strict scrutiny test could have been applied.
8. 41 U.S.L.W. 4609 (U.S. May 14, 1973). The Court invalidated 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403
(1970) and 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (1970), which provided that married male members of the
armed services automatically receive increased quarters allowances and medical and den-
tal benefits for their spouses, whereas married female members must first establish that
their husbands are, in fact, dependent on them for more than one-half of their support.
It ruled that these provisions constituted discrimination in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
9. Id. at 4612. Justices Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall reached this conclusion.
Justices Powell, Burger and Blackmun concurred in the judgment of the Court, but
would have based the decision on Reed without reaching the issue of suspect classifi.
cation. In a single sentence concurrence, Justice Stewart did not explicitly side with
either of these approaches. He concluded that the statute in question worked "an in-
vidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution," id. at 4613, a term traditionally
reserved for strict scrutiny cases, but he also cited Reed, indicating sympathy for the
view expressed by the other Justices in concurrence.
10. See, e.g., United States v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Commonwealth
v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968); Note, The Sexual Segregation of American
Prisons, 82 YALE L.J. 1229, 1246-48 (1973).
11. H.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONe. REC. H 9392 (daily ed. Oct. 12,
1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CoNG. REC. S 4162 (daily ed. March 22, 1972).
The House approved H.J. Res. 208 in its original form by a vote of 354-23. 117 CoNo.
REC. H 9392 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971). The Senate debated the issue in March 1972 and
approved the joint resolution by a vote of 84-8. 118 CONG. REC. S 4612 (daily ed. March
22, 1972). The Amendment has been submitted to the states for ratification.
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Because of the breadth and vagueness of this language, courts would
undoubtedly look to legislative history in interpreting the Amend-
ment.12
An examination of congressional hearings and debates reveals that
Congress adopted a strict interpretation of the Amendment, a position
originally propounded by Professor Thomas Emerson and three stu-
dents from the Yale Law School."a Under this approach sex could not
be a factor in determining the legal rights of women or men. To
achieve the values of group equality and individual self-fulfillment,
the Amendment would have to be applied comprehensively:
The issue under the equal rights amendment cannot be benefit or
detriment, reasonable or unreasonable classification, strict scrutiny,
compelling reasons or the demands of administrative expediency.
Equality of rights simply means that sex is not a factor.1
However, the Emerson interpretation does incorporate two impor-
tant exceptions to this rule of strict equality. First, the Amendment
would not preclude legislation which takes into account a physical char-
acteristic unique to one sex. 15 The exception is, however, limited to
physical characteristics-and does not extend to psychological, social,
or other perceived sex differences-because only physical characteristics
can accurately be described as unique to one sex.1 G Distinctions justi-
fied by this exception would have to be closely scrutinized to insure that
they were legitimate and narrowly drawn.',
12. It has been argued that, since the states will be ratifying the language of the
Amendment itself and not a committee report, courts would look solely to the words
alone, and not to the legislative history, in applying the Amendment. 118 Co.*c. RPc.
S 4377 (daily ed. March 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Stennis); Hearings on 11J. Res.
208 Before Subcomm. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciar,, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
75-76 (1971) (remarks of Senator Ervin) [hereinafter cited as Hearings[. However, courts
have frequently utilized legislative history in developing a framework for the application
of constitutional amendments. See, e.g., the extensive use of legislative history by the
courts in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment: Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 21, 32-33
(1948); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36, 81 (1873).
13. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitu.
tional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). Other possible in-
terpretations of the Amendment-including the "rational basis" test, the "strict scrutiny"
analysis used to test racial classifications, and an absolute standard admitting of no
exceptions-were considered and rejected by Congress. See Note, supra note 10, at 1254-61.
14. Hearings, supra note 12, at 402 (testimony of Professor Emerson). See also Emerson,
In Support of the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 H.,,v. Cir. RgGzrrs.Cv. Lm. L. REv. 225
(1971).
15. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 13, at 893. See also Hearings,
supra note 12, at 402 (testimony of Professor Emerson).
16. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 13, at 893.
17. Professor Emerson and his associates identified six factors which a court should
balance in determining whether the necessary close, direct, and narrow relationship exists
between the unique physical characteristic and the regulation at issue: (1) the propor-
tion of women or men who actually have the characteristic in question; (2) the rela-
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Second, the Emerson framework stresses that the ERA would have to
be harmonized with the overall structure of the Constitution. Laws
or administrative action implementing the ERA would have to be ap-
plied in a manner consistent with such preexisting constitutional rights
as individual privacy.'
8
The Emerson interpretation was praised by the two principal pro-
ponents of the amendment, Congresswoman Martha Griffiths' and
Senator Birch Bayh,20 and referred to with approval in the Con-
gressional Reports. 21 According to ERA opponent Senator Sam Ervin,
the Yale Law Journal article in which that interpretation is set forth
will constitute "primary legislative history" of the Amendment.22 More
generally, the framework outlined in the legislative history parallels
the Emerson interpretation in every relevant respect.
23
tionship between the characteristic and the problem to be solved; (3) the proportion
of the problem attributable to the unique physical characteristic; (4) the proportion of
the problem eliminated by the solution; (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives;
(6) the importance of the problem ostensibly being solved, as compared with the costs
of the least drastic solution. Id. at 894-96.
Examples of laws which could be permissible ate those which concern wet nurses and
sperm donors, establish medical leave for childbearing, and determine paternity. d.;
Hearings, supra note 12, at 402.
18. Hearings, supra note 12, at 402 (testimony of Professor Emerson). Concerning the
right of privacy as it has been developed before and after congressional passage of the
ERA, see Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. Congresswoman Griffiths sent a copy of the Yale Law Journal article by Pro-
fessor Emerson and his associates, supra note 13, to all members of the House, salying:
It will help you understand the purposes and effects of the ERA . . . . .Ie
article explains how the ERA will work in most areas of the law.
118 CONg. REC. S 4250 (daily ed. March 20, 1972).
20. Senator Bayh inserted a copy of the article in the Congressional Record, declaring
it to be "a masterly piece of scholarship." Id.
21. The Separate Views section of the House Report, which prevailed over the ma-
jority position on the floor of the House, see Note, supra note 10, at 1256 n.142, anti
was endorsed by the Senate Report, see S. REP. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1972), stated:
The basic premise of [the ERA] is a simple one. As stated by Professor Thomas
Emerson of Yale University .... the [Amendment] is based on the fundamental prop.
osition that sex should not be a factor in determining the legal rights of women
or of men.
H.R. REP. No. 92-359, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1971). Representative Don Edwards, an-
thor of the Separate Views, characterized Professor Emerson's comments as "entering it
new level of understanding about what the enactment of a constitutional amendment
would in effect do to the quality of life in America." 118 CONc. REc. S 4264 (daily ed.
March 20, 1972).
22. 118 CONG. REc. S 4264 (daily ed. March 20, 1972).
23. The Congressional Reports echoed Professor Emerson's basic propositions that
..sex should not be a factor in determining the legal rights of women or of men,"
H.R. REP. No. 92-359, supra note 21, at 6 (Separate Views), and that "the law must
deal with the individual attributes of the particular person and not with stereotypes
or overclassifications based on sex." Id. at 7, cited with approval in S. REP. No. 92.689,
supra note 21, at 12.
The Reports also endorsed his two exceptions. The Senate Report stated that the
ERA "would not prohibit reasonable classifications based on characteristics that are
unique to one sex," S. REP. No. 92-689, at 12, and the Amendment's supporters stressed
that only physical characteristics fit within this proviso. See 118 CONG. REC. S 4550
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II. Application of the Equal Rights Amendment
Despite commentary regarding the effect of the ERA on the draft,
2 4
little attention has been paid to the momentous changes that it would
require in the structure and policies of the armed services themselves.25
Although the legislative history does not include a detailed exami-
nation of this problem, there was sufficient discussion to warrant the
conclusion that Congress intended the Amendment to be fully applied
to the military.26
It is well established that a citizen does not relinquish his constitu-
(daily ed. March 22, 1972) (remarks of Senator Bayh, characterizing the views of the
majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee as well as his own); Hearings, supra note
12, at 40 (remarks of Congresswoman Griffiths). The Senate Report also declared that
the "'constitutional right of privacy established by the Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut" would limit the rule of complete sexual integration with respect to such
facilities as public toilets and sleeping quarters at public institutions. S. RE'. No. 92-689,
at 12. In response to Senator Ervin's claim that a special privacy exception had to be
incorporated into the ERA itself to insure such limitation, Senator Bayh quoted from
the testimony of Professor Norman Dorsen of New York University Law School:
It is sometimes claimed that an amendment would require all public restrooms to
be integrated, along with the sleeping quarters of prisons and other public in-
stitutions. This, of course, is nonsense. The Constitution must be read as a whole,
and an equal rights amendment would fit into the total constitutional framework.
To this, Senator Bayh added:
It is unequivocally clear in the Report of the Committee on the Judiciary that
this is the intention of the Senate. It is equally clear because identical language is
in the House report, that this is the intention. The right to privacy will continue
to exist and will be fully protected after the equal rights amendment is ratified.
118 CONG. Ric. S 4544-45 (daily ed. March 22, 1972). See also note 78 infra.
In addition to the two exceptions explicitly outlined by Emerson and accepted by
the proponents of the Amendment, the House and Senate Reports refer to the tradi-
tional power of the State to regulate cohabitation and sexual activity by unmarried
persons. See H.R. RaP. No. 92-359, supra note 21, at 7 (Separate Views), quoted with
approval in S. RaE. No. 92-689, at 12. Apparently the authors believe that this police
power, rather than being struck down by the Amendment, would be balanced against
it. This view, however, is inconsistent with the remainder of the Emerson interpretive
framework that Congress adopted, which limits the exception to accommodate consti-
tutional rights only. See pp. 1535-36 supra. Professor Emerson does note that societal
mores regarding existing attitudes towards relations between the sexes may have some
importance in defining the scope of the constitutional right to privacy, Brown, Emerson,
Falk & Freedman, supra note 13, at 902, but it is only it this context that the aboicreferences to state regulatory power should be used by the courts.
24. See Hale and Kanowitz, Women and the Draft: A.l Response to Critics of theEqual Rights Amendment, 25 H~srrNgs L.J. 199 (1971).
25. The military was discussed briefly in Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra
note 15. Senator Ervin placed several excerpts from this part of the article into the
Congressional Record. Commenting on the use of the article by the proponents of the
Amendment, he stated:
Thus the supporters of the amendment feel that it will have the following, effect
on the military and I agree with them. No clearer or more unique history of legis-
lative intent can be presented of the amendment and the military because both
the opponents and the proponents agree on the amendment's effect in this area,
118 Coxo. Rac. S 4576 (daily ed. March 22, 1972).
26. The legislative history of the Amendment reveals that Congress struggled with
the problem of requiring military service, particularly combat duty for women. For Cx-
ample, when Senator Ervin attempted to guarantee that passage of the Amendment
would not affect Congress' right to bar women from compulsory conscription or front
service in combat units, his amendments were soundly defeated. See 118 Co.o. Rxc.
S 4395, S 4408 (daily ed. March 21, 1972).
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tional rights when he enters the armed forces.2- Service personnel are
entitled to all constitutional rights except those which are expressly
withheld by the Constitution or by necessary implication inapplica-
ble. 28 Rights have been said to be "impliedly inapplicable" when they
conflict with the requirements of "military necessity" by seriously im-
pairing the discipline and morale of the armed forces..
2 9
The doctrine of military necessity has been considered in a number
of decisions involving due process and First Amendment rights.30 In
each of these cases the rights involved were balanced against the pecu-
liar needs of the military. Such accommodation is required even when
fundamental constitutional rights are involved,31 because the doctrine
of military necessity is also of constitutional dimension, deriving from
the authorization to raise and maintain armed forces.32 As such, even
those changes required by the ERA would have to be balanced against
the military's need to maintain a minimum level of discipline within
the services. 33 However, only those measures which would substantially
impair discipline or morale-which would, in other words, effectively
deprive Congress of its ability to raise and maintain combat forces-
would present a sufficiently direct conflict between the two constitu-
tional doctrines to require accommodation.34 Moreover, no conflict
27. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); United States v. Tempia, 16 U.SC.M.A. 629,
37 C.M.R. 249 (1967); United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
Whether or not constitutional claims under the ERA could be brought in civil as well
as military courts would depend on a variety of factors, see Mindes v. Seaman, 453
F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971), but in any case the same standards would be applied. The
Court of Military Appeals considers itself "bound by the Supreme Court on questions of
constitutional import." United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 643, 37 C.M.R. 249,
263 (1967) (concurring opinion). See note 31 infra.
28. United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
29. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953); United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A.
165, 173, 37 C.M.R. 429, 437 (1967).
30. See, e.g., Dash v. Commanding General, 307 F. Supp. 849 (D. S.C. 1969); United
States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967); United States v. Tenipia, 16
U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
31. The existing cases have not had to determine whether this balancing process is
always required when military necessity is involved, because they have dealt with coun-
tervailing constitutional rights which were not absolute, i.e., they permitted a balance
against even nonconstitutional government interests. See, e.g., Dash v. Commanding Gen-
eral, 307 F. Supp. 849, 853 (D. S.C. 1969): "[W]here First Amendment rights are in-
volved, whether of civilian or serviceman, the issue always involves the balancing by
the Courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular
circumstances."
32. Miller, A Long Look at Article 15, 28 MiL. L. REv. 37, 51-52 (1965). The consti-
tutional provisions authorizing the raising and regulation of armed forces are U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13, 14, 18.
33. See p. 1536 supra.
34. See Miller, supra note 32, at 52 (emphasis added):
To maintain discipline and thus to maintain an effective army, it is necessary for
Congress to strike a balance between the rights of individuals and the methods by
which the services are to maintain discipline. In so doing, the balance struck must
sometimes infringe upon normal civilian individual rights. When our continued na-
tional existence is at stake, individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution may
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could be said to exist if the military's overriding disciplinary needs
could be satisfied through means less drastic than the creation of sex-
based classifications.35
The vast majority of sexual classifications that presently exist cannot
be justified by legitimate military necessity or by any of the other rec-
ognized exceptions to the ERA. This Note will examine existing mili-
tary policies30 and regulations to determine the changes necessary to
bring them into conformity with the Amendment.
A. Getting In
1. Enlistment
Although the statutory limit on the number of women in the service
has been lifted,37 the Secretary of each branch of the service can pre-
scribe the authorized strength of female enlisted and officer person-
nel.38 For a variety of reasons, including inadequate training facili-
ties,39 the Secretaries have chosen to limit the number of women in
the military to less than two percent of all service personnel.40
In all the services women are subject to more exacting enlistment
criteria relating to minimum age and parental consent requirements. 41
have to give way, for it is not possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the
Constitution.
See also Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 183 (1962).
in which the former Chief Justice equated "military necessity" with "national survival."
35. Certainly the rights granted by the ERA, stated as they are in absolute terms.
must be assigned at least as high a value as other individual liberties. In the case of
the latter, it is well-settled that only interests and needs which cannot be satisfied in
any other manner can be balanced against them. Lewis, Freedon of Speech-An Exami-
nation of the Civilian Test for Constitutionality and Its Application to the Military, 41
MIL. L. Rv. 55, 79 (1968). See also Miller, supra note 32, at 54, in which the author
limits the requirements of military necessity to "the minimum power essential to enforce
discipline in the armed forces (and thereby preserve national security) .... "
36. This Note deals with the effect that the ERA would have on four services: the
Army, the Navy, the Marines, and the Air Force. It does not deal with the special problems
of the Coast Guard, the National Guard, or the Reserves, although most of the anal)sis
below is relevant to these services as well.
37. See note 1 supra.
38. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 3209, 3215, 8208, 8215 (1970).
39. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12444 (testimony of Gen. Bailey). The fact
that women today comprise only about 13,000 of the more than one million Arm)
personnel, id. at 12440, is justified in part by the fact that all basic training of female
enlistees in the Army takes place at Fort McClellan, Alabama, which has a capacity
of only 6,000Z enlistees. See Watson, Fact Sheet, Expansion of the Women's Army Corps,
on file with the Yale Law Journal. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has estab-
lished one percent of the total Marine enlisted strength as a goal for the strength of
enlisted women. One of the reasons cited for this ceiling is the lack of training facilities.
Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12458 (testimony of Colonel Sustad).
40. See p. 1533 supra.
41. 10 U.S.C. § 505 (1970) sets out the qualifications for original enlistment in the
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Men applying must be not less
than 17 years of age, whereas women must be not less than 18. Written parental consent
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They must also have higher scores on mental aptitude tests and more
educational credentials than their male counterparts. 42 Although wom-
en in the Army are barred from strenuous training4 and from vari-
ous occupational specialities which require "heavy" labor,44 they must
meet a minimum physical standard stated in more stringent terms than
that imposed on males.45 Finally, men who have dependent children
may enlist under the normal Army procedures, but women must first
obtain a waiver.
40
Most of these enlistment differentials are justified on a theory of sup-
ply and demand: Since more women, but fewer men, apply than are
desired by the services, the standards for women are set at higher lev-
els.47 This reasoning, based as it is upon judgments concerning the use-
is necessary to enlist a male under the age of 18 or a female under the age of 21. These
distinctions are defended as a means of "protecting" youn; women from "making rash
and immature" decisions and of providing the services "with a screening device by re-
quiring wise and objective judgment of the interested parent or guardian." Utilization
Hearings, supra note 2, at 12498 (testimony of General Bailey).
A bill to make the minimum age of enlistment in the armed forces the same for
both males and females was introduced in Congress on October 4, 1971, H.R. 11064, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), and received great attention from the branches of the service.
See, e.g., Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12500 (testimony of Captain Qulgley).
However, it died in the Armed Services Committee of the House and would have to
be reintroduced.
42. To enlist in the Army men need only to meet the educational requirements of
the specific option for which they are enlisting, not all of which require completion
of high school. Women, however, must possess either a high school diploma or certi-
fication of passage of the equivalency exam. In addition, women are given a different
battery of mental aptitude tests, and it is argued that since the scores are not coui-
parable, the minimum qualifying scores are not required to be equal. Williams, Army
Fact Sheet, Army Enlistment Standards for Men and Women, Aug. 7, 1972, on file with
the Yale Law Journal. An attorney in the office of the General Counsel of the Secretary
of Defense stated:
All of the services have indicated to me that in general the minimum standards
on test results and educational level required in order for a person to enlist or be
an officer are generally higher for women than for men.
Speech by Carole L. Frings, DACOWITS Fall Meeting, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Nov.
12-16, 1972, at 11. See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
43. See note 76 infra.
44. See p. 1547 infra.
45. The consistency with which minimum physical standards are applied-with re-
spect to both men and women-may be open to doubt. But the regulations are stated
in undeniably different terms. For example, potential women Army enlistees must be
able to perform with maximum effort for "indefinite" periods, to take "long" marches,
and to withstand long periods of standing. Men are only ineligible if they have del-
fects which would prevent "moderate" marching, and their ability to perform with
maximum effort need only be for "long" rather than "indefinite" periods. The psy-
chiatric standards for women are also more stringent. See Appendix VIII, Physical Pro-
file Functional Capacity Guide, C22, AR 40-501, June 19, 1968 (in document dated
Aug. 7, 1972), on file with the Yale Law Journal. In the Marine Corps the physical
profile for entry of women is also higher than that required for men. The Navy and
Air Force have the same physical profile requirements for females as for males. TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
46. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 17. This differential also exists in the Marine
Corps. Id. Until recently, both services also required a waiver for all married women, id.,
but the Army cancelled this restriction, effective April 20, 1973. N.Y. Times, March 27,
1973, at 26, col. 3.
47. Speech by Frings, supra note 42, at 11.
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fulness of an entire sex rather than of the individuals that comprise it,
would be unacceptable under the ERA.4s Instead, minimum standards
with regard to age, education, and mental and physical ability would
have to be identical for men and women. Both sexes would have to be
subjected to the same tests, except to the extent that certain medical
criteria would be permitted to deal with the unique physical charac-
teristics of each sex.
The courts might decide, as they have in employment discrimination
cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,40 to supplement this
rule of identical treatment with safeguards against more subtle forms
of discrimination. Thus intelligence tests would have to be carefully
scrutinized to insure that they are actually testing general intelligence
-or skills specifically needed by the military-rather than a familiarity
with male-oriented items in our present culture10 High physical stand-
ards or skill requirements which eliminated a large proportion of
women might also be challenged as unnecessarily restrictive at a time
when eighty-five percent of military jobs are noncombatant.5t With
regard to such a challenge, the services and ultimately the courts would
48. See 118 Co-G. REc. S 4390 (daily ed. March 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Ba)h):
[T]he first impact of this equal rights amendment as far as the military services
are concerned would be to say that any woman who wants to serve her country
will have the opportunity to do so, and will be either admitted or denied on the
basis of the same grounds used to admit or den) men.
But see Speech by Frings, supra note 42, at 12-13, which suggests that the Amendment
could be interpreted to permit the services to choose the most qualified men and women,
adjusting the test standards and educational qualifications in order to get enough men
and enough women for their particular needs. This view would not require that the
standards be identical for both men and women, but would instead allow the military
departments to pick the "cream of the crop" among both men and women applicants.
This interpretation is inconsistent with the EILVs basic premise that judgments must
be based on individual characteristics rather than the perceived characteristics of an
entire sex group. See note 23 supra.
The requirement of individualized selection would also invalidate distinctions based
upon sex-role generalizations. For example, the special waiver requirement for women
with dependent children could not be justified by either the observation that mothers
spend more time with young children than fathers or the judgment that they ought
to do so.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
50. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 13, at 971. For example, the
Armed Forces Qualifying Test is presently being revised because it was found to be
male oriented. Interview with Col. Bette Morden, Special Assistant to the Director of
the "WAG, Washington, D.C., Dec. 6, 1972. (Col. Morden retired on Dec. 31. 1972.) By
stressing areas, such as mechanics, which are unfamiliar to many women, the test
eliminates qualified women. On the other hand, a test specifically designed to examine
an applicant's skill in a particular field would be legitnnate under the EIL, if nar-
rowly drawn to fit the needs of the services.
Courts have already struck down allegedly "race-neutral" tests and educational re-
quirements which were found to be discriminatory in effect. See Griggp v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La.
1970); Broussard v. Schlumberger Well Services, 315 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See
also Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (holding unlawful
a seniority system neutral on its face which perpetuated the effect of an employer's past
discriminatory acts).
51. 118 CONG. REc. S 4390 (daily ed. March 21, 1972).
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have to determine whether the legitimate needs of the military justi-
fied the maintenance of standards that barred virtually all women from




With undisguised bluntness the military services discriminate against
women in the procurement of officers. Female applicants to the Army
Officer Candidate School (OCS) are required to have completed two
years of college, whereas male applicants need only have a secondary
school education. 53 Direct appointments to a number of positions in
the Navy and Marines are statutorily restricted to males. 4 Custom
and regulation prohibit women from being considered for admission
to the three major military academies,r5 even though they are not
barred by statute.56 Finally, the military's ROTC program was until
recently completely closed to women 57 and even now is available only
on a limited, experimental basis.58
52. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Court sustained black cm-
ployees' contention that an employer's requirement of a high-school education or passing
of a standardized general intelligence test as a job condition violated Title VII, be-
cause neither of these requirements was related to the jobs in question); 2 CCH EMI'LOY.
PRAc. GUIDE § 6286 (1971) (employer who applied a minimum-height rule to job ap-
plicants of both sexes found to have violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, since
evidence revealed that the height requirement would be satisfied by the average male
but by only twenty percent of the females and that such a requirement was not justified
as a business necessity).
53. House, Fact Sheet, Procurement of WAG Officers Compared with Procurement
of Male Officers, on file with the Yale Law Journal. In addition, females must have
a G.T. (mental) score of 115 as compared with a G.T. score of 110 for males.
54. 10 U.S.C. §§ 5575, 5576, 5577, 5587 (1970). These restricted career areas in the
Navy are the Supply Staff Corps, the Chaplain Staff Corps, the Civil Engineer Staff
Corps, and officers designated for engineering, aeronautical engineering, and special
duty. Women in the Navy and Marines also may not be limited duty officers. 10 U.S.C.
§ 5589 (1970).
Women similarly are barred from the aviation cadet program, into which civilians
and enlisted members of the Navy and Air Force can be commissioned. See 10 U.S.C.
§§ 6911, 6913, 8257 (1970). The Navy has recently selected eight women for its aviation
cadet program as "a test program established as a part of the Navy goal of equal rights
and opportunities for women." N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1973, at 77, col. 1.
55. Interview with Col. Morden, supra note 50. Several Senators have nominated
women for admission to the academies, see, e.g., 118 CONG. REc. S 4860 (daily ed. March
28, 1972), but none has been accepted.
56. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 4346, 9346, 69581 (1970).
57. This restriction was by custom rather than by statute. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2102-11 (1970)
refers only to the admission of "persons" into ROTC.
58. A WAG ROTC program was initiated in September 1972 at ten colleges to test
the effectiveness of ROTC as a procurement source for women officers. In conjunction
with this program, twenty ROTC scholarships were to be made available to female
students. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12449 (testimony of Gen. Bailey), House,
Fact Sheet, supra note 53. The Air Force ROTC program for women bc.an In 1969
and is now open to women at 156 of the 170 colleges with Air Force units. See The
Lady is an Air Force General, AMMAN MAGAZINE, Sept., 1971, at 45. There are presently
17 women enrolled in Navy ROTC at four colleges. See Speech by Frings, supra note
42, at 15; N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
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Under the ERA, officer candidacy requirements and methods for
procuring officers would have to be identical for men and women.
Although qualifications would not have to be standardized for all the
services, the requirements for commissioning within each service would
have to be the same for men and women,59 and no path could be
closed to either sex. For example, both the proponents60 and the op-
ponents6' of the Amendment have asserted that its passage would




1. Structure of the Services
The Army is organized into a number of functional units, such
as the Infantry, the Medical Corps, and the Corps of Engineers, all
of which are open to men. Women, on the other hand, are restricted
to a single unit, the WACs, although they may be temporarily de-
tailed to other units.6 3 The other services do not have separate women's
corps per se, but they still handle women separately for a number of
administrative purposes. 4 For example, in the Marines, if there are
59. Thus the Army could either raise its OCS educational standard to meet those
presently applicable to women only, or lower the requirement to a secondary education
for everyone.
60. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 86 (remarks of Congressman Mikva):
[Is it really that shocking or radical a notion to think that maybe women ought
to be allowed into the service academies if they want to go? If we accept the notion
that there are and ought to be women officers in our various branches of the
gervice, why should they not be allowed to go to the school of their choice in
terms of the training they want to obtain for their service to their country?
See also id. at 275 (testimony of Dr. Bernice Sandier); id. at 50 (remarks of Congress.
woman Griffiths).
61. See 118 CONG. Rac. S 4575 (daily ed. March 22, 1972) (remarks of Senator Ervin,
indicating that Professors Kurland and Freund joined him in this view).
62. The Directors of Women in each of the services have defended the sexual seg-
regation of the academies on a variety of grounds: They argue that a sufficient number
of qualified women are acquired through other procurement sources, that the academies
are geared to combat from which women are excluded, and that integration would not
be economically worthwhile. See, e.g., Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12471,
12493 (testimony of Capt. Quigley); id. at 12496 (testimony of Gen. Baile)): id. at 12471
(testimony of Gen. Holm).
These considerations, however, would not suffice to prevent integration. Under the
Amendment, no mere state interest, such as administrative convenience or fiscal neces-
sity, could justify a sex classification, see p. 1535 supra, and combat could not be wholly
closed to women, see pp. 1550-52 infra. Furthermore, a recent study by the Air Force
found that there exists no significant economic impediment to the sexual integration
of the Air Force Academy. Interview with Gen. Holm, Director of Women in the Air
Force, Washington, D.C., Dec. 6, 1972. General Holm has concluded that the continued
segregation of that facility derives more from a lack of commitment to the training of
women leaders than to any of the arguments listed above.
63. 10 U.S.C. § 3071 (1970).
64. Speech by Frings, supra note 42, at 21. See also TAsK Fosc.E REOaT, supra note
2, at B-26.
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an appreciable number of women at one base, a separate women's
company will be created within a battalion.a
Under the ERA the WACs and all other remnants of separate
women's corps would have to be eliminated.," Although the Supreme
Court has never found sexually "separate but equal" facilities to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, such facilities would be imper-
missible under the ERA. The proponents of the Amendment have
pointed out that the separate treatment of two groups, one of which
has previously been treated as inferior by the law, can never in fact
be equal.0 7 Moreover, separation by sex is indisputably classification
by sex-and that is forbidden by the ERA. 8
Congress evidently did not intend, however, that sexual integration
encompass integrated living facilities. The legislative history shows
that the constitutional right to privacy was thought to permit the
military to maintain separate living quarters for men and women, so
that they would not be forced to undress or perform personal func-
tions in the presence of the opposite sex.6 This argument is dependent
on two unsettled legal conclusions: that the right to privacy protects
65. Interview with Colonel Sustad, former Director of Women Marines, Washington,
D.C., Dec. 5, 1972 (Col. Sustad retired on Jan. 30, 1973).
66. When questioned by the House Appropriations Committee, the Judge Advocate
General of the Army commented on the effect that the ERA would have on the struc-
ture of the WACs:
The primary function of maintaining a separate Women's Army Corps will probably
be eliminated. Whether those distinctions based on sex that would remain pernnis.
sible under the amendment will be continued through a separate label for female
members is primarily a question of policy. However, the impact of the equal rights
amendment, in my opinion, will so limit the permissible distinctions that It would
be inaccurate to designate female members as belonging to a separate corps, as
that term is used to designate separate branches within the Army.
Reprinted in Speech by Frings, supra note 42, at 21-22.
67. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 13, at 902-03; Emerson, In
Support of the Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 14, at 231.
Congresswoman Martha Griffiths recognized the inadequacy of a dual system:
I am not for "separate but equal" because there is no such thing. The "separate but
equal" schools that we were sending blacks to were not equal. The "separate but
equal" schools that you are sending women to are not equal.
Hearings, supra note 12, at 47. Dr. Bernice Sandier observed that sex-segregated col.
leges, particularly when operated by the same governing body, are reminiscent of race.
segregated facilities. Id. at 272.
The case law under the Fourteenth Amendment has been mixed. Compare Kirstein
v. Rector & Visitors, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) and Bray v. Lee. 337 F. Supp.
934 (D. Mass. 1972) with Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970).
68. "The law may operate by grouping individuals in terms of existing characteristics
or functions, but not through a vast overclassification by sex." H.R. REP. No. 92-359,
supra note 21, at 6 (Separate Views). See note 29 supra.
69. See 117 CONg. REC. H 9368 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (remarks of Congressman Ryan):
An argument which has been made against the original language of the equal rights
amendment is that it would violate common sense and public standards by pro-
hibiting the separation of sexes in the sleeping quarters of such public institutions
as coeducational colleges, prisons, and military barracks . . . . The constitutionally
guaranteed right to privacy affords grounds for reasonable separation of the sexes
in these instances.
See also Hearings, supra note 12, at 290, 404; note 23 supra.
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individuals from the embarrassment that would result from forced
cohabitation and that the right so interpreted extends to military
personnel.70 Neither conclusion, however, is unreasonable. First, the
Ninth Circuit has held that the Fourth Amendment privacy right
encompasses "[t]he desire to shield one's figured [sic] from view
of strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite sex .... ",,
Second, while the military may legitimately deprive its personnel of
much of the privacy guaranteed to civilians, such deprivations must
always be justified by compelling interests of discipline or morale. "
Since living quarters are now segregated throughout the military, it
is unlikely that the services would assert, or the courts declare, that
the protection of sexual privacy through such an arrangement con-
travenes the doctrine of military necessity. Thus the courts would be
justified in validating Congress' conclusion that the right to privacy,
when balanced against the ERA, would permit the limited separation
of the sexes for sleeping and toilet purposes." The precise degree to
70. For an examination of the similar assumptions behind Congress' conclusion that
prison sleeping areas could be kept segregated, see Note, supra note 10, at 1259 n.157.
71. Ford v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963) (police officer held to have vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment right of a woman who had come to the police station
to report an assault. Over her objection, the officer had taken photographs of her in
the nude and circulated them among the police personnel at the station. The court
stated that "[wje cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy than the naked
body," the shielding of which is "impelled by elementary self-respect and personal
dignity." Id. at 455). Although the right to privacy is arguably broad enough to en.
compass all such serious intrusions upon basic human dignity, see Bloustein, Privacy
as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. R'.'. 962
(1964), the courts have been well advised to proceed cautiously, with an eye to the
established doctrines surrounding the express constitutional provisions from which the
privacy right was derived. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 921 (1973). In this regard, it should be noted that the right to
segregated sleeping quarters propounded by Congress is the closest corollary in the
military context to the privacy of home and sexual relations already protected by
Supreme Court decisions. See cases cited in note 18 supra; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969).
72. See pp. 1537-39 supra. A finding that the right to privacy bars forced cohabita-
tion in military housing would not require the services to provide individual bed.
rooms and showers for every soldier. For one thing, there is no reason to believe that
forcing men and women to disrobe in the presence of the same sex violates the "ele-
mentary self-respect and personal dignity" shielded by the right to priv . See note 71
supra & p. 1546 infra. Moreover, it could probably be shown that the provision of
individual living quarters, at least in basic training and combat situations, would seriously
jeopardize the preparation and utilization of an effective fighting force, in violation
of the doctrine of military necessity. See pp. 1547 & 1551-52 infra.
73. Since privacy is an individual right, the possibility of waiver raises special prob-
lems. Presumably, if a group of service personnel waived their right to be housed
separately, the Equal Rights Amendment would require that they be assigned quarters on
the basis of sex-neutral criteria, which might result in voluntary coeducational sleeping
facilities. While the content of the privacy right may be determined by reference to
societal mores, such mores in the absence of the privacy right are not of constitutional
dimension and cannot be used to defeat the Amendment's ban on sex classifications.
See note 23 supra. However, it is possible that individual rights which require detailed
government re.lation-such as the rights to privacy and the equal protection of the
laws in the military, public school, or prison context--cannot be waived.
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which entire housing facilities could be kept separate is not clear,7"
but Professor Emerson has suggested that courts and administrators
may look to the current mores of the community regarding relations
between the sexes in determining the scope of the privacy exception."
2. Basic Training
All enlisted recruits receive some form of basic training before
being trained in their occupational specialties. In each of the services
such training for males stresses discipline and physical development,
while that of women is focused on administrative subjects. 0 A simi-
lar disparity characterizes officer basic training. 7 Moreover, training
units are sexually segregated,T frequently at different bases.70
These differences undoubtedly reflect the disparate utilization of
men and women in the military. After ratification of the ERA the
services would still be permitted to adapt basic training to probable
later assignments if they so desired, but placement in a particular
training program could not be based on an overbroad sex classifica-
tion. 0 In other words, a man and a woman would have to receive
identical basic training, unless an examination of the individual phys-
ical capability or assignment potential of each dictated different pro-
74. In planning housing facilities the military could follow the model of universities
which have established coeducational dormitories, while maintaining the right to pri-
vacy by designating separate floors or separate parts of the same building for each of
the sexes. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 274 (testimony of Dr. Sandier).
75. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 13, at 902. This conclusion is not
unreasonable in light of the fact that social traditions and mores have been used to
determine the very existence of the right to privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 735
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Cold.
berg, J., concurring).
76. In the Army women are trained in professional development (benefits of military
service, community services, leadership, personnel policies, etc.) but are not trained to
be "traditional" military professionals. Watson, Fact Sheet, supra note 39. Although
physically qualified, see note 45 supra, they do not take long marches or utilize their
hand-to-hand combat potential. The closest that WACs come to combat training Is
two days of field training that "has the air of a well-disciplined group of girl scouts
on a camp-out." Phillips, On Location with the WACs, Ms., Nov., 1972, at 62. In the
Navy shipboard organization and rugged physical training are excluded from the fe-
male program. Interview with Captain Quigley, Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for
Women, Washington, D.C., Dec. 5, 1972. Instruction for women in the Marines includes
subjects such as the application of make up, how to avoid trouble, and how to wear
a uniform. Interview with Colonel Sustad, supra note 65. Air Force training follows a
similar pattern. Interview with General Holm, supra note 62.
77. Interviews with Colonel Sustad, supra note 65, and Captain Quigley, supra note 76.
78. See, e.g., Interview with Colonel Sustad, supra note 65; Priem, Fact Sheet, Ex-
pansion of the Women's Army Corps, on file with the Yale Law Journal. Continental
Army Command (CONARC) is currently studying a proposal to shorten the WAG Of.
ficer Basic Course from eighteen to nine weeks, after which the WAG officer would
attend the basic officer course of one of the male branches. Priem, Fact Sheet, supra.
The Air Force officer program already permits some mingling of the sexes during periods
not set aside for physical training. Interview with General Holm, supra note 62.
79. See note 39 supra.
80. See p. 1550 infra.
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grams. A few differences in the physical training of all women might
be justified by the unique physical characteristics of the sexes, but
such differences would have to correlate closely with the characteristics
in question and could not be based on the generalization that women
are weaker than men.81
Although the nature of the training given men and women would
thus have to be almost identical, the training units themselves could
still be segregated to the limited extent required by military neces-
sity and privacy. The services might argue that discipline and team-
work cannot be instilled in the basic trainee unless the unit with
which he sleeps remains discrete and sexually segregated throughout
the training period .82 The burden would be on the military to prove
that such separate but equal training units8 3 are essential to the dis-
cipline and effectiveness of the armed forces.84 The right to privacy
would only demand that sleeping and bathroom facilities be kept
separate, which could be accomplished through segregated barracks
or perhaps only separate sections or floors within a single building.s3
3. Occupational Specialties
The military occupational classification (MOS) system is designed
to identify, classify, and relate skills and personality characteristics to
military job requirements.86 In the Army women are specifically ex-
cluded from those MOS associated with combat, close combat sup-
port, hazardous duty, and strenuous physical activity, as well as those
that would require their assignment to an isolated area.8 7 As of July
81. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 13, at 893.94.
82. This claim might be based on a perceived critical need for intensie group in-
teraction and for depriving trainees of the company of the opposite sex.
83. Under the less drastic means analysis, see note 35 supra, separation of the sexes
would be limited to the smallest unit necessary to satisfy the requirements of privacy
and discipline.
84. See note 114 infra.
85. See p. 1546 supra.
86. For example, factors that are to be considered in the training classification of
an individual in a particular MOS in the Army are: (1) needs of the Army, (2) existing
grade and MOS imbalances (both local and Army-wide), (3) budgetary or tratel re-
strictions, (4) medical condition and physical limitations, (5) enlisted commitments, (6)
training and experience (both civilian and military), (7) education, (8) test scores. (9)
preference of individual, (10) avocation and hobbies, and (11) normal pattern of career
progression. GAO, Improper Use of Military Personnel (1971), reprinted in Utilization
Hearings, supra note 2, at 12410.
87. Morden, Fact Sheet, WAG Utilization, Aug. 15, 1972, on file with the Yale Law
Journal. Out of a total of 482 enlisted MOS, 434 are available to women. Id. Until
August 1972, only 140 MOS had been open to women. The integration of women into
these areas has been slow. Interview with Col. Morden, supra note 50. The only posi-
tions which are closed to men are WAC Commander, WAG recruiter, and certain jobs
in the medical field involving the care and treatment of female patients. Utilization
Hearings, supra note 2, at 12443 (testimony of General Bailey).
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1972, medical and dental specialties and administrative personnel ac-
counted for the occupational specialties of 94.6 percent of the en-
listed women in that service.8 8 Similarly, women are excluded from
more than half of the army officer MOS. 89
Although the "Navy's intrinsic mission [is] as a seagoing operating
force," 90 women cannot be assigned to duty on naval vessels other
than hospital ships and transportsY1 Furthermore, sea duty or even
"eligibility for command at sea" is often an important qualification
in the selection for officer shore assignments. 9 2 Finally, the "restricted
line," a broad officer classification encompassing the more technical
occupational specialties, is statutorily closed to womenY8 As a result
of these restrictions, Navy women are concentrated in personnel jobs.0'
Enlisted women Marines may serve on an interchangeable basis
88. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 26. Prior to July 17, 1972, women generally
enlisted in the Administrative, Supply and Medical Fields. Women can now enlist for
the following additional career fields: air defense missiles, wire maintenance, precision
devices, textile and leather repair, automotive maintenance, motor transport operator,
printing, law enforcement, and radio code. Since July 17, approximately twenty-five women
have enlisted in these new career fields. The Army anticipates that with more publicity
many more women will enlist in these areas that had been exclusively male career fields.
Elder, Fact Sheet, Career Field Enlistments, Aug. 7, 1972, on file with the Yale Law
Journal.
89. The total number of officer IOS in the Army is 365. Of the 188 from which
women are excluded, eighty-one are medical officer MOS, thirty-five are male command
MOS, forty-nine involve railroad, marine, or aviation operations, and twenty.three others
involve strenuous physical labor or assignment to a combat or hazardous duty area,
Morden, Fact Sheet, supra note 87. As a -result, forty-six percent of the women now
serving as army officers are in the field of administration and personnel, while another
14.3 percent are in positions commanding other women. One of the MOS from which
women are excluded is Post Commander. Women command organized WAC units con-
sisting of approximately 100 women. Groups of less than fifty women at a station are
called WAC contingents and are administered and commanded by men. Morden, Fact
Sheet, supra note 87. Some classifications are particularly obtuse: women may be mill.
tary police officers, but not correctional officers. Numerical List of Occupational Spe-
cialties, Section III, C31, AR 611-101, June 13, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
90. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12455.
91. 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1970). Women have served aboard Navy ships only with medical
staffs on hospital vessels and transports belonging to the Military Sealift Command.
Washington Post, Feb. 15, 1972. at A3, col. 5. Admiral Zumwalt's Z-gram 116, CNO nmsg
071115Z Aug. 72, noted that a limited number of officer and enlisted women were being
assigned to the regular ship's company of the U.S.S. Sanctuary, a recommissioned hos-
pital ship, as a pilot program. Although Z-gram 116 also authorized "limited" entry
of enlisted women into all ratings, the statutory prohibition against assigning women to
combat ships still exists, so that actual assignment policies are unclear.
92. NR-0836 (1948) states that "the officer detailed as Commandant of a naval dis-
trict shall be an officer of the line in the Navy eligible for command at sea," Thus
women officers, whose career patterns should qualify them for just such leadership as.
signments, are arbitrarily excluded. Denby, Command Opportunity and Flag Grade for
Women Officers, June 19, 1972, at 23-24 (unpublished thesis at U.S. Naval War College).
93. See note 54 supra. Theoretically, women in the "unrestricted line," encompassing
most other officer assignments, can be designated for temporary duty in a restricted
line community not involved in sea duty.
94. Coye, supra note 5, at 12484, citing Bureau of Naval Personnel Computer Printout,
April 29, 1971. Commander Denby concluded after studying the opportunities for fe-
male officers that there was "irrefutable evidence that women officers have stagnated
in a relatively limited number of career paths primarily in administrative areas." Denby,
supra note 92, at 61. See also Coye, supra note 5, at 12476.
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with men in about two-thirds of the enlisted Marine MOS." Wom-
en Marine officers are also restricted to two-thirds of the available
MOS fields.9 6 Moreover, a regulation specifically states that women
officers may succeed to command only over those activities which
have the administration of women Marines as their primary function. 7
By contrast, only five officer career fields in the Air Force are
closed to women, and these are all associated with aircraft which might
be engaged in combat missions.98 However, half of the male officers
are concentrated in the pilot and navigator categories,"" which are
two of those closed to women as a matter of Air Force policy.' 00 The
number of specialty fields open to enlisted women has recently been
expanded, but few women have yet been assigned to these new fields.2
0 1
The primary reasons for the exclusion of women from various oc-
cupational fields, whether by law or regulation, are physiological and
cultural. Some jobs are considered to be beyond the physical capa-
bilities of women. 102 Others, most notably combat and sea duty,10 3
are simply thought to be male activities. 10 4 Since women have proven
95. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12462 (testimony of Colonel Sustad). Thirteen
of the thirty-six enlisted MOS are completely closed to women. Limited duty and com-
bat ship assignments are also closed to women Marines. See notes 54 & 91 supra.
96. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12461 (testimony of Colonel Sustad). The
twenty-three MOS available to female officers are not the same as the twenty-thre con-
sidered suitable for enlisted women. For example, enlisted female personnel may be
trained in logistics, but officers may not; officers may be in the Supply Services, but
enlisted women may not.
97. Interview with Colonel Sustad, supra note 65.
98. 10 U.S.C. § 8549 (1970) prohibits the Air Force from assigning women to duty
in aircraft engaged in combat missions.
99. Interview with General Holm, supra note 62.
100. Id. Thus, as in the Navy, women "airmen" are excluded front one of the pri-
mary missions of the branch of the service of which the) are considered full members.
101. Although, as of June, 1971, ninety-eight percent of enlisted career fields were
technically open to women, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 25, as of July of the
following year three-quarters of enlisted women were still administrative specialists and
clerks. Id. at 26.
102. The Air Force excludes women from such jobs as telephone lineman for this
reason. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12451 (testimony of General Holm).
103. When asked about the justification for restricting women from seagoing positions,
Captain Quigley replied:
I would say first of all that you have to look at the sociological picture, and I do
not think that this country, societally speaking, is ready for women sailing sub.
marines under the sea and commanding aircraft carriers across the waters.
Id. at 12495. See also id. at 12469 (testimony of General Bailey).
104. These justifications parallel those that have long been asserted in defense of
occupational exclusion in other areas of employment. Under the Fourteenth Amendment
and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the courts have outlawed exclusionary em-
ployment practices based on such sexual stereotypes. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969):
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Ridinger v.
General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Cheatwood v. South Central
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific
Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (D.C. Cal. 1968); Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529,
95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971). See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Employment
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. RLv. 1109 (1971).
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their usefulness as administrators and personnel officers, the services
may also feel that they are needed to provide a skilled continuity
base.105 Finally, women may be excluded from some training pro-
grams because, in the places where that skill is needed, a woman
cannot be sent for other reasons. 100 Most revealing is the attitude
that women would serve in a much larger number of service posi-
tions (as they did during World War II) if there were a national
emergency.
10 7
Under the Amendment all occupational specialties would have to
be open equally to men and women. The basic principle of the ERA
that the law must deal with individual attributes means that sex
would be an impermissible factor in determining the selection of a
career field. The principle enunciated in the Congressional Reports
is echoed throughout the testimony and debates: Particular women
may be barred from jobs for which they are not fitted, just as par-
ticular men do not serve in those positions for which they are not
qualified, but blanket prohibitions based on sex are impermissible.' 08
Application of the ERA to combat presents special problems, because
countervailing constitutional provisions are of particular importance
in this area. For example, it has been argued that the right to privacy
might exclude women from at least some combat duty if sexually
Title VII provides that it shall be an "unlawful employment practice" for an em-
ployer engaged in an industry affecting interstate commerce, who has twenty.five or
more employees, to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. ... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970). Although
the statute's basic proscription against sex discrimination is absolute on its face, one
significant qualification is included. The provisions do not apply "in those certain in.
stances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business enter prise 
.
42 U.S.C. & 2000e-2(e) (1970). This "bfoq" test is similar to the Equal Rights Amend-
ment's "unique physical characteristics" exception. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman,
supra note 13, at 926.
105. Coye. supra note 5, at 12480.
106. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12486 (testimony of General Bailey). These
reasons include: (I) In an "emergency" it might be necessary to send tile person filling
a particular job slot to a combat area, and (2) housing or grade restrictions might pre-
clude transfer of a woman to an area that requires a particular MOS,
107. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12445, 12467, 12486 (testimony of General
Bailey); id. at 12502 (testimony of General Holm).
108. See, e.g., 117 CoNG. REc. H 9369 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971); 118 CONG. REc. S 4585
(daily ed. March 22, 1972); 116 CONG. REc. 28005 (1970) (remarks of Congresswoman
Griffiths).
In a speech to the American Bar Association, Rita Hauser, United States Representative
to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, discussed the effect of the Amend-
ment on the military:
I think that women should be judged in the same way as men. Some men make
soldiers and others don't. Some bang at the typewriters and some do bandage work
and similarly women will be judged on their capabilities for being soldiers or
otherwise and not on the basis of sex.
Reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. S 4374 (daily ed. March 21, 1972).
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segregated sleeping quarters could not be provided or enforced.100
While such considerations might justify the barring of one sex from
a combat situation in which even minimal privacy is impossible, it
would not justify a general reliance on sexually segregated combat
units, much less the arbitrary exclusion of women from all combat
duty.110 The purposes of the Amendment could not be thwarted by
assertion of the economic and administrative burden of providing
some separate facilities on field bases and warships.
Perhaps with reference to the doctrine of military necessity, Con-
gresswoman Griffiths and Senator Bayh indicated that the final de-
cision regarding the use of a particular woman in combat would
be a military prerogative.1 ' One acceptable interpretation of these
comments is that, taking into account the exigencies of battle, a com-
mander in the field must be given broad discretion in deciding the
role a given individual should play.112 A broader interpretation would
permit the military to limit the assignment of women to certain com-
bat positions as a matter of policy if it could be demonstrated that
further integration would impair discipline and military effective-
ness to such an extent that the ability of the troops to operate in a
combat situation would be seriously affected.113 However, the mili-
tary would be expected to test the effectiveness of integrated units in
a variety of situations during the present peacetime environment and
109. Letter from Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist to Representatihe Don
Edwards, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the House judiciary
Committee, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 12, at 328.
110. The debate on Senator Ervin's proposed amendment to exempt women front
combat duty, which was soundly rejected, see note 26 supra, reveals that set eral Senators
contemplated that the ERA would require the assignment of women to front-line combat
positions. See 118 CONG. REC. S 4395-4409 (daily ed. March 21, 1972).
111. Congresswoman Griffiths stated:
The draft is equal. That is the thing which is equal But once )ou are in the
Army you are put where the Army tells you where )ou are going to go.
S. REP. No. 92-689. supra note 21, at 13. Senator Ba)h commented that once in the
service, a woman would be assigned to duty where her commanders thought she was
qualified to serve. A commander would not need to send a woman into the front
trenches if he felt that it would not be in the best interests of the combat unit to
make such an assignment. 118 CoNG. REc. S 4390 (daily d. March 21. 1972). See also S.
REP. No. 92-689, supra note 21, at 14 (statement of Congressman Edwards).
112. A field officer in command of a squad or platoon must be allowed to utilize
his or her soldiers as combat conditions dictate, without fear of constant judicial super-
vision. But such an officer, no less than one at the battalion or division lctel. wouldbe
barred from following a consistent pattern of sexual discrimination by categorically
banning all women from certain combat positions.
113. The comparative effectiveness of women generally as combatants has been qucs-
tioned and, is presently impossible to evaluate. See Mead, A Xational Serr'ce System as
a Solution to a Variety of National Problems, in TuE Da-rFT, A HANDBooK oF FAcTs &
ALTERNATIvEs 99, 107-09 (S. Tax ed. 1967); Hale & Kanowitz, Women & the Draft: A
Response to Critics of the Equal Rights Amendment, 23 HASrINGs L. 199 (1971); Tiger,
Male Dominance? Yes, Alas. A Sexist Plot? No., N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1970. § 6 (Magazine),
at 124.
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to produce empirical evidence establishing the necessity for any de-
sired segregation to the satisfaction of the courts.114
III. Moving Up
Although many statutory limitations on the promotion of women
to high ranking positions have been repealed,15 the proportion of
such positions actually filled by women is far smaller than the pro-
portion of women in the military as a whole." 0 This discrepancy
may be explained, at least in part, by continuing discrimination
against women in promotion law and policy."1
114. The imposition of such a burden is justified by the fact that military fears
concerning sexual integration could too easily be based upon impermissible assumptions
about proper sex roles and the capabilities of women, which might be disproved over
time in the face of successful performance by qualified women and the education of
service personnel concerning the value of such integration. The government should there-
fore be required to undertake experiments with sexual integration at all levels and to
prove to the courts by clear and convincing empirical evidence that those levels that
have not been integrated cannot be operated under such conditions because of the over-
riding requirements of military necessity.
A similar burden has recently been placed upon states which seek to provide different
criminal sentencing schemes for male and female offenders. While such differential
treatment was once routinely left to the discretion of the state, see Note, supra note 10,
at 1245, several courts now require "substantial justification" for this sexual distinction,
"empirically grounded to the greatest extent possible." New Jersey v. Costello, 59 N.J.
334, 346, 282 A.2d 748, 755 (1971). See United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F.
Supp. 8, 15 (D. Conn. 1968); Liberti v. York, 28 Conn. Stpp. 9, 11, 246 A.2d 106, 107
(1968); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
115. Until 1967, VAC promotion to the grades of captain, major, and lieutenant
colonel could be made only to fill vacancies in those grades, whereas male officers could
be considered without regard to vacancies. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3299(f), (g) (1964), as amended,
10 U.S.C. § 3299 (1970). Also repealed at that time was Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L.
85-861, § 1(80)(E), 72 Stat. 1479, which prohibited WAG reserve officers from being pro-
moted above the grade of lieutenant colonel, and 10 U.S.C. § 3215 (1964), as amen-ded,
10 U.S.C. § 3215(a) (1970), which placed a two percent lilnit on the percentage which
the prescribed authorized strength in female warrant officers bore to the total authorized
strength of the Army in warrant officers. 10 U.S.C. § 5462 (1970) still gives the Secretary
of the Navy power to prescribe the number of women officers who may hold appoint-
ments in each grade above lieutenant junior grade in the Navy and above first lieu.
tenant in the Marines.
116. See Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12440 (testimony of Congressman Pike):
There are roughly a million people in the Army of which [sic] only 13,000 are
women, about one woman for every 80 men. There is one woman brigadier general
for 255 Army brigadier generals, one woman colonel for 500 Army colonels, one
woman lieutenant colonel for every 190 Army lieutenant colonels, one woman major
for every 120 Army majors, one woman captain for every 140 Army captains. Down
in the realm of lieutenant, the women approach, but do not reach their propor-
tionate share. The Army treats its women better than the Navy and the Air Force
in terms of rank. There are still no female Major Generals.
See SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON THE UTILIZATION OF MANPOWER IN TilE MILITARY OF TilE 11OUSE
COMM. ON ARMED SERvicas, 9 2D CONG., 2o SEss., REPORT H.A.S.C. No. 92-58, at 14660 (1972).
117. Only the Air Force has no separate promotion lists or quotas for men and
women, yet even in that service there is a comparatively low number of female officers.
Air Force General Holm stated that the large ratio in the lower grades was "due in
large part to the expansion of the force in recent years," and that because of past pro-
motion restriction there are few women coming up through the system who have the
time in service and the grade necessary for promotion. Utilization Hearings, supra note
2, at 12488-89; Telephone Interview with General Holm, Director Secretary of the Air
Force Personnel Council, April 16, 1973. See Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12,488
for a breakdown by sex of each rank in the Air Force.
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Although enlisted women compete with enlisted men for Army
promotion, separate promotion eligibility lists are maintained for
WAC officers."1 " Navy and Marine enlisted women compete for pro-
motion with their male counterparts in their skill specialty.'" o Fe-
males may not, however, be considered for selection as limited duty
officers,120 an officer designation to which enlisted men who have
served for a number of years in a specific technical field may be pro-
moted. Navy and Marine women officers are considered for promotion
through the rank of captain by separate selection boards.12' Although
the selection boards for male officers continue to supervise promotion
to the highest ranks, women may only be appointed above the grade
of captain (to flag rank) by order of the Secretary of the relevant
service, and then only when there is a position of sufficient importance
and responsibility to warrant such a designation and it is determined
that the person best qualified to fill that position is a woman. More-
over, any woman officer so appointed reverts to her permanent grade
when she is detached from the flag position, 22 although men retain
their rank.
Since separate but equal treatment would be forbidden by the
Amendment unless required by privacy considerations or military
necessity,123 all vestiges of separate promotion systems would have to
be eliminated, even if the military could demonstrate that the re-
118. Fact Sheet, WAG Promotion Policies, on file with th Yale Law Journal; 10
U.S.C. §§ 3283, 3296, 3311 (1970). The Director of the WACS is not atitomatically ap-
pointed a lieutenant or major general upon selection, as are the chiefs of the various
male corps, and she alone is statutorily said to serve "normally for not more than four
years." Compare 10 U.S.C. § 3071 (1970) with 10 U.S.C. q 3036 (1970).
119. When Captain Quigley noted this fact at the Utilization Hearings, Representative
Pike replied that nevertheless:
If you are an enlisted man in the Navy you are sLx times as likely to be an E-6
as an E-1 [the lowest rank]. If you are an enlisted woman, you are more than twice
as likely to be an E-I as an E-6. There are almost as many commanders in tc Navy
as there are ensigns, unless you're a woman, in which case there are three ensigns
for every commander.
Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12440.
120. 10 U.S.C. § 5589 (1970).
121. 10 U.S.C. § 5764 (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 90-130 §§ l(19)fJ), (K). 81
Stat. 378 (1967). The appointment and promotion of women officers are governed by
laws separate from those dealing with male officers. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. 5703, 5704,
5760, 5767(c), 5771 (1970). A statute which specified the number of years a male officer
in the Navy or Marines had to serve in one grade before he could be considered for
promotion to the next higher grade was suspended by Exc, Order No. 11,437, 3 C.F.R.
142 (1968 Comp.), but a similar section pertaining to women officers has not been sus-
pended. See 10 U.S.C. § 5752 (1970). Another statute provides for the temporary pro-
motion of officers in time of war or national emergency. Male officers in the Navy in
the grade of ensign or above and in the Marines in the grade of second lieutenant or
above may be so promoted. Only female ensigns and second lieutenants may be pro-
moted in this manner. 10 U.S.C. §§ 5787, 5787(b) (1970).
122. 10 U.S.G. § 5767 (1970), a amended by Pub. L. No. 90.130, § 1(19)(N), 81 Stat.
379. This applies to women in the grade of rear admiral in the Navy and major general
or brigadier general in the Marine Corps.
123. See pp. 1544-45 supra.
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quirements for advancement were equal for each sex.124 It has been
argued that these rules presently serve a valuable function, since
women cannot fairly compete for promotion with men so long as
they cannot serve in combat or command men.12 - However, since the
Amendment would modify or eliminate these discriminatory prohi-
bitions as well,120 this justification need not immediately concern the
courts.
IV. Getting Out
Although recent statutory reforms included the repeal of a number
of laws which provided for the involuntary retirement of women of-
ficers at an earlier age than men,'12 7 remnants of these discriminatory
provisions remain. 28 In addition, service regulations provide that a
woman may be terminated whenever it is established that she, whether
married or single, is the parent of a minor child, is pregnant, has
given birth to a living child while in military service, or has become
a parent or stepparent of a minor child. '12  To compound this in-
124. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia's antimiscegenation law pro.
hibiting interracial marriages held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause despite the fact that it affected the races equally).
125. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12500 (testimony of Colonel Sustad).
126. See pp. 1550-52 supra.
127. See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-559, §§ 1(25), (27), 74 Stat. 272,
repealed by Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, § l(12)(A) , 81 Stat. 376: Act of
Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-861, § 1(94), 72 Stat. 1483, repealed by Act of June 30,
1960, Pub. L. No. 86-559, § 1(22), 74 Stat. 271; Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85.861,
§ 1(192), 72 Stat. 1535, repealed by Act of June 30, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-559, § 1(66),
74 Stat. 278; Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-861, § 1(192), 72 Stat. 1536, repeale by
Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, § l(31)(A), 81 Stat. 382.
128. Compare, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 3848 (1970) with 10 U.S.C. § 3916 (1970) (Secretary
of the Army may defer the required retirement of lieutenant colonels until age 60 for
officers in five male corps but only until the thirtieth year of service for Regular Army
and WAC officers); Compare 10 U.S.C. § 6398 (1970) with 10 U.S.C. § 6390 (1970) (re-
tirement of Navy and Marine regular officers set at age 62 unless deferred until age
64, but no deferment is provided for certain classes of women officers, whose retirement
date is set at a sufficiently short period of service to require retirement, in most cases,
long before the age of 62).
129. Although the specific regulations vary from service to service, they are all based
on Exec. Order 10,240, 3 C.F.R. 749 (1949-1953). In the Air Force, modifications have
removed the minor children provisions, allowed for cancellation of the discharge pro.
ceedings if the pregnancy is terminated prior to a final determination by the discharge
authority, and instituted a waiver of discharge provision to replace the virtually ai-
tomatic discharge tinder the initial regulations. AFR 40 (May 1, 1970), as amended, AFR
36-12(40) (March 1971). The Army, Navy and Marine Corps pregnancy regulations are:
AR 635-120 (June 9, 1971) (Army officers); AR 635-200 (June 21, 1972) (Army enlisted
personnel); NPM 3830160(5) (April 1972) (Navy offieers); NPM 3850220(2) (July 1, 1969)
(Navy enlisted personnel); MCB 1900 (Jan. 28, 1972) (Marine Corps officers and enlisted
personnel). There are, of course, provisions which allow for the discharge of male meni-
hers, see, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 3814, 6292, 6293, 6294, 6295, 8814 (1970), but none relate to
the male's status as a parent.
The constitutionality of the Air Force pregnancy regulations has already been chal-
lenged under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d
1372 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 409 U.S. 947 (1972), vacated and remanded for con.
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equity, there is no provision for the payment of severance pay to
regular officers in the Army and Air Force involuntarily discharged
for pregnancy-130
Under the Amendment, retirement provisions within each service
would have to apply equally to men and women. Retirement differen-
tials based on specialty corps would be permissible, since the ERA
would require integration of all such units. However, those provi-
sions which allow extensions for male officers only would not survive.
Discharge policies would also have to be reformulated after pas-
sage of the ERA. The rules with regard to bearing or having a minor
child would undoubtedly be eliminated, since their extension to men
would virtually eliminate all career officers. Distinctions between
single and married women who bear children would be permitted
only if the same distinction were drawn between single and married
men who father them.
Rules requiring discharge because of pregnancy present a special
problem.1al Since pregnancy is a physical condition unique to women,
the military would be permitted to enforce regulations which apply
solely to pregnant women. However, such regulations must be nar-
rowly drawn and not unduly harsh. A "problem" of legitimate con-
cern would have to be identified (such as the danger of job-related
injuries) and a sufficiently close relationship between the problem and
the physical characteristic of pregnancy would have to be shown. 32
The military would in every case have to select the alternative-e.g.,
transfer rather than discharge-that would have the least drastic ef-
sideration of the issue of mootness, 41 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S. Dec. 18. 1972) (upholding
the relevant regulation); Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37 (D. Colo. 1972) (finding the
relevant regulation unconstitutional). For a complete discussion, see Note, Pregnancy
Discharges in the Military: The Air Force Experience, 86 HAuv. L. Rm'. 568 (1973).
130. 10 U.S.C. § 687 (1970). With certain exceptions, a nonregular officer involun-
tarily released after five or more years of continuous active military service is entitled to
a readjustment payment of two months' basic pay for each year of senice. This payment
is payable only to nonregular officers separated involuntarily for pregnancy. General
Holm reported that many young Air Force women decline to consider or accept regular
appointments because of this rule. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12502.
131. The Supreme Court will soon have a chance to clarify the existing due process
and equal protection limitations on pregnancy rules for government emplo)es. A series
of lower court decisions, employing the uncertain degree of judicial scrutiny triggered
by sex classifications challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, are in substantial
conflict, and the Court has granted certiorari in two of these cases. Compare Heath v.
Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972) and La Fleur v. Cleveland
Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.LAV. 3569 (U.S. April 23,
1973), with Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., No. 71-1707 (4th Cir. Jan. 15.
1973), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3569 (U.S. April 23, 1973).
132. See note 17 supra. A court operating under the ERA might find appropriate a
sex-neutral rule allowing any temporarily disabled serviceman or woman and his or her
doctor to determine the duration and timing of leave. See Brown, Emerson, Falk &
Freedman, supra note 13, at 929-32.
1555
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 82: 1533, 1973




By expanding the opportunities for women and allowing them to
reap the full benefits of military service, these major changes required
by the ERA would confer benefits upon society as a whole as well
as the women directly affected. Servicewomen would gain increased
economic and social independence, and important educational and
career opportunities. Equal job availability in all areas of employ-
ment, both public and private, would be stimulated as women learned
traditional "male" skills, and the military would be able to serve as
a symbol to the nation of the sexual equality sought by Congress.'
The difficulties accompanying these changes, though substantial,
would probably be temporary. The integration of women into the
armed services would undoubtedly parallel in many ways the far
more sweeping integration of blacks undertaken in 1948.30 In that
year the services were ordered to drop their racial quota systems and
to administer all assignments and promotions on an equal merit
basis. 1 37 The Army in particular moved slowly in implementing
these orders, with warnings of decreased efficiency and morale prob-
lems, but these fears proved largely unjustified. 138 Although racial
133. The services have discharged, rather than transferred, women in this situation,
justifying the decision on legitimate military necessity. According to the court In Rob-
inson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37, 40-41 (D. Colo. 1972) (finding unconstitutional the Air
Force regulation requiring discharge for pregnancy), transfer constitutes a less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose and must be used as an alternative to
discharge.
134. For example, Air Force Manual 36-11 para. 3-1313, Jan. 29, 1971, provides for
such a deferment when "a physical defect may be cleared within twelve months." The
regulation identifies this deferment as compatible with the military need for "readiness
and effectiveness of the fighting force." Temporary medical leaves are also granted for
a wide variety of ailments. See D.O.D. Directive No. 1300.11, Oct. 23, 1970; D.O.D. Memo-
randum, Drug Abuse Control Program, July 12, 1972; D.O.D. Directive No. 1010.2,
March 1, 1972.
135. See Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 24, at 207-20.
136. Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1948). The preamble to the order succinctly
states the case for women also:
Whereas it is essential that there be maintained in the armed services of the United
States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and oppor-
tunity for all those who serve in our country's defense ....
137. Begeman, Air Force Tries Democracy, 122 NEw RE'UBLIC, May 15, 1950, at 14.
138. See generally Kenworthy, The Case Against Army Segregation, 275 ANNALS OF Tiln;
AMER. ACAD. OF POLIT. & Soc. Sct. 27 (1951). See also Begeman, supra note 137, at 14-15,
quoting E. H. Kenvorthy, executive secretary of P'resident Truman's Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces:
Almost without exception, commanding officers stated frankly that, although they
had recognized the merits of the new Air Force racial policy . . . they had been
apprehensive. Without any exception, they added that they 
were amazed with the
ease with which the new policy had been effected and the absence of trouble.
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problems have not been eliminated in the services, the program of
integration was largely successful and served as an important example
to civilian society.' 39
Like the integration of blacks, which took six years to complete,140
the elimination of sex discrimination in the military cannot be ex-
pected to occur immediately. However, each branch of the service
has already begun the task of reviewing its regulations and policies
in order to comply with the ERA.1 41 Furthermore, the Amendment
would not take effect until two years after ratification, which may
itself take up to seven years to complete . 42 This interim period, hope-
fully in a peacetime environment, should provide ample time for the
transition. By combining the redrafting of laws and policies with an
intensive educational program aimed at ameliorating friction and
misunderstanding with regard to sex roles, 4 3 the armed services
should be able to comply with the Amendment's mandate for equali-
ty of opportunity and treatment within the military.
139. See Begeman, supra note 137, at 15, quoting Kenworthy, see note 138:
It was the opinion of some officers that this program could not but have an effect.
eventually, on civilian attitudes; that it was impossible for a white boy to live and
work beside a Negro in basic training and in the technical schools without some
real change taking place in his attitude toiward race and racial equality.
140. 67 U.S. NEWS & " OLD REPORT, Sept. 1, 1969, at 26.
141. See note 4 supra.
142. H.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNG. REc. H 9392 (daily ed. Oct. 12,
1971); SJ. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CoNG. REC. S 4612 (daily ed. March 22, 1972).
143. See Dell, The Black Soldier-A Situation Report, Sotniris, Feb.. 1973, at 28,
for a discussion of the efforts in the Army to promote racial harmony and influence
behavior patterns.
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